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It has become something of a commonplace to argue that in order to
fight the oppression of women, it is necessary to unpack the ways in
which different forms of oppression intersect with one another. No
single factor, be it nature or nurture, economic exploitation or cultural
domination, can be said to be the single cause sufficient to explain the
multifaceted sources of patriarchy and sexism. Consequently, intersec-
tionality has become the guiding principle for an increasing number
of left-wing feminists from both the global north and south. As a re-
sult, most publications in gender theory today have engaged with the
concept of intersectionality in one way or another — whether to pro-
mote it, to criticize it, or simply to position oneself with regards to it.
Yet, strikingly enough, in all the literature engaging with intersec-
tionality there is barely any mention of the feminist tradition of the
past that has argued for exactly the same point for a very long time: an-
archist feminismor, as I prefer to call it, ‘anarchAfeminism.’This specific
termwas introduced by social movements whowanted to feminize the
concept and, in so doing, provide more visibility to a specifically fem-
inist strand within anarchist theory and practice.This anarchafeminist
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tradition, which has largely been neglected both in academia and in
public debate generally, has a particularly vital contribution to offer
today.
To begin, together with queer theory’s ground-breaking work
aimed at dismantling the gender binary of ‘men’ and ‘women’, it is
important to vindicate once again the need for a form of feminism
that opposes the oppression of people who are perceived as women
and who are discriminated precisely on that basis. Notice here that I
am using the term ‘woman’ in a way that includes all types of women:
AFAB women,1 AMAB women, feminine women, masculine women,
lesbian women, trans women, queer women, and so on and so forth.
Despite the alleged equality of formal rights, women are still the object
of constant discrimination, and the advancement of queer rights can
be accompanied by a retrogression in regard to women’s battles. The
emergence of right-wing figures such as Milo Yiannopoulos showed
that one can support gay and queer rights and still be amisogynist. But
the most infamous data about the continued oppression of women,
even in a context such as the US where we have come to expect im-
provements in queer rights, are the data about violence against women
and bodies that are perceived as feminine: there are currently between
126 and 160 million ‘missing girls’ from the global population.2 Trans
women are more likely to be raped and suffer violence than trans men,
so much so that the term ‘transmisogyny’ has been created in order
to point to situations in which transphobia and misogyny meet and
mutually reinforce each other.
Therefore, far from viewing feminism as an issue of the past, it has
become more imperative than ever to connect this standpoint with
1 I am using the terms ‘Assigned Female at Birth’ (AFAB) and ‘Assigned Male at Birth’
(AMAB) to signal the fact that by speaking about ‘male’ and ‘female’ we implicitly
accept the state sanctioned view according to which our gender corresponds to the
sex assigned to us at birth. Notice here how the (almost always binary) gender system
and the state apparatus are tightly interwoven, since it is through our state IDs and
passports that a gender identity is attached to our lives.
2 The ‘missing girls’ are not counted in the hundreds, or thousands, but in the millions.
As of today, there are somewhere between 126 to 160 million girls missing from
the global population as a consequence of sex-selective abortion, infanticide, and





the oppression of all bodies perceived as ‘femina’. However, such a
standpointmust be supported by an articulation of women’s liberation
that does not create further hierarchies, and this is precisely where
anarchafeminism is useful. While other feminists from the left have
been tempted to explain the oppression of women on the basis of a
single factor, anarchists have always been clear in arguing that, in order
to overcome the patriarchal order, we have to fight the multifaceted
ways in which diverse factors — economic, cultural, racial, political,
etc. — converge to uphold it.
The neglect, if not outright historical amnesia, that the important
leftist tradition of anarchism has been faced with is certainly the result
of this viewpoint being banned in academia and public debates in
general, where it has most often been misleadingly portrayed as little
more than a call for violence anddisorder.This ban has been enacted to
the detriment of historical accuracy, global inclusiveness, and political
efficacy.
My proposal is to remedy such a gap by formulating a specific
anarchafeminist approach adapted to the challenges of our time.3 My
aim is not only to make the anarchafeminist tradition more visible as
an important component of past women’s struggles, and therefore re-
establish a kind of historical continuitywhich has beenmissing to date,
even though this would certainly be a worthwhile endeavour. Besides
historical accuracy, recovering anarchafeminist insights has the crucial
function of enlarging feminist strategies precisely in a moment when,
as intersectional feminists have argued, different factors increasingly
converge to intensify the oppression of women by creating further
class, cultural, and racial divisions among them.
3 A first version of this essay was presented at the Night of Philosophy in New
York City on 26 January 2018 and then at the UNESCO Night of Philosophy
on 15 November 2018. An extract of the talk was published in Liberation on 15
November 2018 <https://www.liberation.fr/debats/2018/11/15/nuit-de-la-philo-
pour-un-anarcha-feminisme_1692047> [accessed 12 April 2020], whereas a full
version appeared on Public Seminar 7 March 2018 <http://www.publicseminar.
org/2018/03/anarchafeminism/> [accessed 13 April 2020]. A Spanish translation
of the latter by Miguel Ibáñez Aristondo appeared on 12 September 2018 in Re-
porteSextoPiso <http://reportesp.mx/anarcafeminismo-chiara-bottici> [accessed 13
April 2020], a French translation by Jeanne Etelain et Anaïs Nony in the journal
La Deleuziana, 8 (2018) <http://www.ladeleuziana.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/
02/Bottici-1.pdf> [accessed 13 April 2020], and an Italian translation in Per cosa
lottare. Le frontier del progressismo, edited by Enrico Biale and Corrado Fumagalli
(Milano: Fondazione Giacomo Feltrinelli, 2019).
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In a time in which feminism is often accused of being mere white
privilege, this task is more crucial than ever. The emancipation of
women from the global north can indeed happen at the expense of
women from the global south, whose reproductive labour within the
household is often used to replace the labour previously performed by
the now ‘emancipated’ women. It is precisely through the adoption
of such a global perspective, which is all the more necessary today
because of the increased mobility of capital and labour forces, that
the chain connecting gendered labour across the globe becomes more
apparent, and the timeliness of anarchafeminism as an intersectional
approach along with it. To put it concisely, we need a more multifa-
ceted approach to domination. In particular, we need an approach that
is able to incorporate different factors as well as the different voices
coming from all over the globe. As Chinese anarchafeminist He Zhen
wrote at the dawn of the twentieth century in her Problems of Women’s
Liberation:
Themajority of women are already oppressed by both the gov-
ernment and by men. The electoral system simply increases
their oppression by introducing a third ruling group: elite
women. Even if the oppression remains the same, the ma-
jority of women are still taken advantage of by the minority
of women. […] When a few women in power dominate the
majority of powerless women, unequal class differentiation
is brought into existence among women. If the majority of
women do not want to be controlled by men, why would they
want tobe controlledbywomen?Therefore, insteadof compet-
ingwithmen for power, women should strive for overthrowing
men’s rule. Once men are stripped of their privilege, they will
become the equal of women. There will be no submissive
women nor submissive men. This is the liberation of women.4
These words from 1907 show how prophetic and relevant anarcha-
feminism is, and they present the answer to our question:why anarcha-
feminism?They show that anarchafeminism is thebest antidote against
the possibility of feminism becoming white privilege and thus a tool in
the hands of a few women who dominate the vast majority of them.
4 He Zhen, ‘Women’s Liberation’, in Anarchism: A Documentary History of Libertarian
Ideas, ed. by Robert Graham, 3 vols (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2005), i, pp. 336–
41 (p. 341).
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In an epoch when the election of a woman president is presented as a
liberation for all women, or when women such as Ivanka Trump can
lay claim to feminist battles of the past by transforming the hashtag
#womenwhowork into a tool to sell a fashion brand, the fundamental
message of the anarchafeminists of the past is more urgent than ever:
‘Feminism doesn’t mean female corporate power or a woman Presid-
ent; it means no corporate power and no Presidents.’5
THE ONTOLOGY OF THE TRANSINDIVIDUAL
At this point, one may object: why insist on the concept of feminism
and not just call this anarchism?Why focus on women? If the purpose
is to dismantle all types of oppressive hierarchies, should we not also
get rid of the gender binary which, by opposing ‘women’ to ‘men,’
imprisons us in a heteronormative matrix?
I should make it clear immediately that when I write ‘women’ I do
not mean some supposed object, or eternal essence, or, even less so, a
pre-given object. Indeed, to articulate a specifically feminist position
while maintaining a multifaceted understanding of domination, we, as
feminists, require a more nuanced understanding of ‘womanhood’. By
drawing upon insights from an ontology of the transindividual, I will
argue that bodies in general, and women’s bodies in particular, must
be considered as processes rather than as objects that are given once
and for all. We are not things, we are relations.Women’s bodies, like all
bodies, are bodies in plural because they are processes, processes that
are constituted by mechanisms of affects and associations that occur
at the inter-, intra-, and the supra-individual level. To give just a brief
example of what I mean here, think of how our bodies come into being
through an inter-individual encounter, how they are shaped by supra-
individual forces, such as their geographical location, and how they are
made up of intra-individual bodies such as the air we breathe, the food
we eat, or the hormones we swallow.
There can be different roads to articulate an ontology of the
transindividual. In Europe, the term has been at the centre of dis-
cussions arising from Étienne Balibar’s reading of Baruch Spinoza’s
5 Peggy Kornegger, ‘Anarchism: The Feminist Connection’, in Quiet Rumors: An
Anarcha-Feminist Reader, ed. by Dark Star (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2012), pp. 25–
35 (p. 31).
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ontology as well as the result of a resurgence of interest in the philo-
sophy of Gilbert Simondon.6 These two strands of the debate on the
transindividual have at times unfolded separately, and at times con-
verged, as with Balibar’s philosophy, since it is from Simondon that
Balibar derived the notion of transindividuality which he uses to in-
terpret Spinoza’s Ethics.7 In this article, I mainly draw inspiration from
Balibar’s insight that Spinoza’s concept of individuality is best under-
stood as transindividuality (1997), and from Moira Gatens’s feminist
readings of such an ontology, according to which the most monist of
all ontologies — Spinoza’s — is also the most pluralist.8
The starting point for Spinoza’s philosophy is that there is being
rather than nothing.9 Indeed, he writes that not to exist is to lack
power, and to be able to exist is to have power.Thus, if what necessarily
exists are only finite beings, then finite beings are more powerful than
an absolutely infinite being, which is absurd. Therefore, he concludes
that either nothing exists or an absolutely infinite being exists. But we
exist, either in ourselves or in something else, which necessarily exists.
Therefore, an absolutely infinite being necessarily exists.10 This is, in
my view, the most beautiful lesson of Spinozism: if there are twenty
people in a room, then an absolutely infinite being necessarily exists.11
6 Besides Étienne Balibar, Spinoza: From Individuality to Transindividuality (Delft:
Eburon, 1997), explored below, more recent influential views include: Balibar and
Vittorio Morfino, Il transindividuale: soggetti, relazioni, mutazioni (Milano: Mimesis,
2014); Balibar, ‘Philosophies of the Transindividual: Spinoza, Marx, Freud’, trans.
by Mark G. E. Kelly, Australasian Philosophical Review, 2.1 (2018), pp. 5–25; Jason
Read,The Politics of Transindividuality (Leiden: Brill, 2015); Daniela Voss, ‘Disparate
Politics: Balibar and Simondon’,Australasian Philosophical Review, 2.1 (2018), pp. 47–
53—who expands onGilbert Simondon’s concept of transindividuality, by comparing
itwithBalibar’s view—andMurielCombes,Gilbert Simondon and thePhilosophy of the
Transindividual, trans. by Thomas LaMarre (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013), the
first monograph fully devoted to Simondon and the philosophy of the transindividual.
7 Spinoza does not explicitly use the term transindividual or transindividuality, so
for those who like to trace the origins of this ontology of the transindividual, one
should follow Balibar, Spinoza: From Individuality to Transindividuality, which expli-
citly draws inspiration from Simondon, L’Individuation psychique et collective (Paris:
Aubier, 1989), which, in turn, coined the expression ‘transindividuality’.
8 Moira Gatens, Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power, and Corporeality (London: Routledge,
1996), pp. 56–57.
9 Ethics i, Def. 1; CWS [The Collected Works of Spinoza, see abbreviations], i, p. 408.
10 Ethics i, 11 Dem.; CWS i, pp. 417–18.
11 The argument of the twenty persons is used inEthics i, 8, Schol. 2,CWS i, p. 415, where
Spinoza starts adding some a posteriori elements to the a priori proof for the existence
of an infinite substance developed in Propositions 1 to 7 of Part i.
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But this also implies that there is an infinite unique substance that
expresses itself through an infinity of ‘attributes’, where the latter term
stands for what the intellect perceives of the substance as constituting
its essence.12 Among the infinity of such attributes, those that are ac-
cessible to humans (at least under current conditions) are thought and
extension. A single thought is therefore just a mode of the attribute of
thought, whereas a single body is a mode of the attribute of extension.
But, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, I should
clarify that this does not mean that thought and extension, or ideas
and things, are separate or even parallel to one another. Spinoza clearly
states that ‘[t]he order and connection of ideas is the same [idem]
as the order and connection of things’;13 thought and extension are
the same (idem), not parallel to one another, and it is even less true
that they are two different substances. It is important to emphasize
this because whenever we speak about mind and body, or ideas and
things, our long-inherited dualistic metaphysical framework tends to
surreptitiously creep in. The first step in order to get to a truly plural-
istic conception of the body is to get rid of this framework, and thus
of the idea that a body is something different, parallel, or opposite to
a mind. When we say ‘a body’ we do not mean something separate or
even opposed to ‘a mind’ or ‘a soul’. ‘Body’ and ‘mind’ are just modes
expressing two different attributes of the same substance.
This also leads us to the specific understanding of individuality as
transindividuality which one can develop by drawing inspiration from
Spinoza, particularly from the sort of compendium of his physics that
he put forward in Part ii of the Ethics, where his eccentric materialism
fully emerges.14 If thought and extension are just two of the infinite
attributes of the unique substance, then we cannot speak of a mater-
ialist ontology without immediately adding that it is not the brute,
inanimate, staticmatter that is at stake here. Spinoza’smaterialism is an
eccentric form of what we might call a ‘spiritual materialism’, precisely
because extension and thought are just two of the infinite attributes of
the same substance.
12 Ethics i, Def. 4; CWS i, p. 408.
13 Ethics ii, 7; CWS i, p. 451.
14 Ethics ii, 13–15; CWS i, pp. 457–63.
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Within such an ontology, individual things (res singulares) exist
only as a consequence of the existence of other individual things15
with which they participate in an infinite network of connections.16
Notice here that this view also implies that causality must not be
understood in the sense of a linear succession of events, but rather
as a multiplicity of connections linking individuals, which are them-
selves made up of more simple and more complex individuals that are
all causally related. As a consequence, every individual is constantly
composed and decomposed by other individuals with whom it enters
into contact through a process of individuation, which involves infra-
individual, inter-individual, and supra-individual levels.17 In order to
render this complexity, Balibar argued, individuality must be under-
stood as transindividuality.
In this understanding, individuals are therefore never atoms,
events, let alone subjects that are given once and for all. They are pro-
cesses, the result of constant movements of association and repulsion
that connect more simple individuals with other simple individuals,
but also with more complex ones that constantly make and unmake
bodies. To get a crude but efficient sense of what I mean here, think of
how animal bodies are composed and decomposed by the liquids that
traverse them; we drink, but we perspire, we urinate, we are constantly
processing liquids by which in turn we are being processed. Similarly,
human individuals are constantly composed by the molecules that
we breath in and out of our bodies through a transindividual pro-
cess of association and attraction linking different forms of human,
animal, and vegetative life into the same network. Notice that within
this monist ontology the same holds true for thoughts; as individuals,
bodies are the result of all the modes with the attribute of thought
that we constantly encounter, be they the reflections you are reading
or the phone conversation you had this morning. To put it even more
strongly, the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order
and connection of things, because ideas are nothing but affirmations
of the body. Again, observe here how easily one escapes the trap of
metaphysical dualism. Since the body and the mind are nothing but
15 Ethics i, 28; CWS i, pp. 432–33.
16 Balibar, Spinoza, p. 27.
17 Ibid.
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modes within different attributes of the unique substance, no radical
separationbetweena subject of knowledge and its object can subsist. In
fact, the very notion of a self-enclosed individual, let alone of a subject,
of a Cartesian ego, does not make any sense in this ontology. Human
beings do not occupy a privileged position within this ontology, being
themselves nothing but more complex individuals than, say, a stone
or a chair, because they result from more complex movements of at-
traction and repulsion between more or less complex individuals. In
other words, they are not given entities, but rather processes, webs of
affective and imaginal relations that are never given once and for all.
As Gatens has emphasized, this also means that in the process of
individuation that generates individuals in general, and human beings
in particular, complex dynamics of imaginary identification become
particularly crucial.18 We constantly meet and recognize or misrecog-
nize ourselves in certain images of the body, which include images that
we have of our bodies and of other bodies, as well as images that others
have of them and which become constitutive of our own being. For
Gatens, the key term for keeping together the mental and the material
side of this process is ‘the imaginary’ and for Spinoza it is ‘imagination’.
The latter term, in his theory of knowledge, denotes a set of ideas
produced on the basis of present or past bodily affections.19 Following
Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd, we can summarize Spinoza’s view of im-
agination by saying that it is a form of bodily awareness, which means
awareness of the perceiving body as well as of the perceived bodies
encountered and that, as a consequence, it is always, properly speaking,
a form of collective imagining.20 In order to avoid misunderstandings,
18 One of the first commentators to point to this constitutive role of imagination in
Spinoza was Antonio Negri. See, in particular, his The Savage Anomaly: The Power of
Spinoza’s Metaphysic and Politics (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1991),
pp. 86–97. According toCarolineWilliams, what is new in this book byNegri, Balibar’s
Spinoza and Politics (London: Verso, 1998), and Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd,
Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past andPresent (London:Routledge, 1999) is that they
draw attention to Spinoza’s novel, materialist rendering of imagination, without simply
dismissing it as a source of errors. See Williams, ‘Thinking the Political in the Wake of
Spinoza: Power, Affect and Imagination in the Ethics’, Contemporary Political Theory,
6 (2006), pp. 349–69 (p. 350). What I am trying to do here is to combine the merit of
Spinoza’s ontology with a theory of the imaginal that more clearly distances itself from
the modern philosophy of the subject.
19 Ethics ii, 26 Dem.; CWS i, p. 469 and Ethics ii, 40 Schol. 2; CWS i, pp. 477–78.
20 Gatens and Lloyd, Collective Imaginings, p. 12.
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we should recall that an idea does not only consist of mental content.
Imagination has a bodily grounding, because themind is just the body
that is felt and thought. Furthermore, according to Spinoza, an idea is
‘a conception of the mind’.21
Notice here that while Gatens’s feminist interpretation of Spinoza
focuses on the specifically human usage of this capacity to imagine,
there is nothingwithin this conception that prevents us fromextending
Spinoza’s understanding of imagination to all other forms of extension,
or, in more contemporary terms, of materiality. Despite the different
forms that this idea could take, there is no a priori reason in this ontol-
ogy to assume that thinking and imagining would be a prerogative of
the human. I also want to point out that while Spinoza uses the typic-
ally modern concept of imagination, which, in the history of western
philosophy, is imbued with humanism, we can certainly reformulate
his insights in terms of a theory of the imaginal. In particular, it is with
regards to what Gatens called ‘imaginary bodies’, and what I would
like to call ‘imaginal bodies’, that we can understand the psychological
side of the process of individuation described above.Whenever a body
encounters another body, which can be a simple body, like a glass of
water, or a more complex one, like another animal, a change in its own
constitution will occur. It is in this sense, and in order to keep together
what happens at the infra, inter-, and supra-individual level, that the
notion of transindividuality becomes particular helpful. In sum, bod-
ies are always necessarily bodies in plural, both social and individual
at the same time, because their individuality is always and inevitably
a form of transindividuality. But if bodies are always transindividual
processes, then we also need a theory that is able to conceptualize our
capacity to imagine without falling into the false alternative between
theories of imagination as an individual faculty and theories of the
imaginary as a social context. And it is precisely at this point that, as
I hope I have shown, the concept of the imaginal becomes particularly
useful.22
21 Ethics ii, Def. 3; CWS i, p. 447.
22 I have developed the concept of the imaginal as an alternative to theories of imagin-
ation understood as an individual faculty and theories of the imaginary understood as
a social context, in Chiara Bottici, Imaginal Politics (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2014).
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I would like to list the benefits of such an ontological shift towards
transindividuality as the prism through which individuality must be
understood. Firstly, instead of elaborating a formof feminism and then
having to add ecology as something different from feminism itself,
here the two positions are unified from the beginning because, in an
ontology of the transindividual, the environment is not something
separated from us but, rather, the environment is us — literally some-
thing constitutive of our individuality. Secondly, imaginal collective
formations such as sex, race, and class are from the beginning con-
ceptualized as constitutive of our individuality, and thus as intimately
intertwined.Thirdly, when women’s bodies are theorized as processes,
as sites of a process of becoming that takes place at different levels, we
can speak about ‘women’ without incurring the charge of essentialism
or culturalism. There is no place here for the opposition between sex
(nature) and gender (culture) because there is no place for body-mind
dualism. Lastly, by adopting this transindividual ontology, we can also
use the concept of woman outside of any heteronormative framework,
and thus use the term such that it includes all types of women: femin-
ine women,masculine women, AFABwomen, AMABwomen, lesbian
women, bisexual women, trans women, cis women, asexual women,
queerwomen, and soon and so forth. In sum, ‘women’ encompasses all
bodies that identify themselves and are identified through the always
changing narrative of ‘womanhood’.
To conclude this point, a transindividual framework allows us to
answer the question ‘what is a woman?’ in pluralistic terms while also
defending a specifically feminist form of anarchism. Developing the
concept of women as a series of open processes also means going
beyond the dichotomy of the individual versus the collective: if it is
true that all bodies are transindividual processes, then the assumption
that there could be such a thing as a pure individual, separate, or even
opposed, to a given collective, is at best a useless abstraction and at
worst a deceitful phantasy.
WHICH WOMEN? AND WHICH ANARCHAFEMINISM?
Adopting an anarchafeminist lens entails taking the entire globe as
the framework for thinking about the liberation of women. This im-
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plies going beyond any form of methodological nationalism, that is,
privileging certain women and thus certain national or regional con-
texts. If fighting the oppression of women means we have to fight all
forms of oppression, then statism and nationalism are no exceptions.
If one begins by looking at the dynamics of exploitation by taking
state boundaries as an unquestionable fact, one ends up reinforcing
the very oppression one meant to question in the first place. A slogan
for this proposal might look something like: ‘the globe first.’ Adopting
anything less than the entire globe as our framework is at best naive
provincialism and at worst obnoxious ethnocentrism.
Whereas several feminist theories produced in the global north
have failed to understand the extent to which the emancipation of
white, middle-class women happened at the expense of a renewed
oppression of working-class racialized bodies, anarchafeminists have
traditionally adopted amore inclusive perspective. It is no coincidence
that many anarchist theorists, from Pjotr Alexejewitsch Kropotkin to
PaulReclus, havebeengeographers and/or anthropologists. By explor-
ing the processes of production and reproduction of life independent
of state boundaries and on a planetary scale, these authors not only
were able to avoid the pitfalls of any form of methodological national-
ism, but could also perceive the global interconnectedness of forms of
domination, beginning with the intertwinement of capitalist exploit-
ation and colonial domination.
A tangential remark I would like to offer here is that while one can
use labels such as Latin American or Chinese anarchafeminism, I be-
lieve that those labelsmust be used as ladders to be abandoned as soon
aswehave reached the top.Thevitality of the anarchafeminist tradition
consists precisely in its capacity to transcend state boundaries, meth-
odological nationalism, and even the Eurocentric biases that persist
throughout most of the radical theory produced in the global north. It
is very revealing, for instance, that most of the feminist tools, whether
rooted in Marxist feminism, post-structuralist feminism, or radical
feminism, derive from theories produced in a very small number of
countries.We can actually name and count them on one hand: France,
Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and perhaps Italy.
To combat this Eurocentric trend, and the subsequent privileging of
Western Europe in building frameworks of emancipation, it is pivotal
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to bring texts produced by anarchists worldwide to the centre of the
discussion. This global inclusion is the only way to insure a form of
feminism beyond Eurocentrism and beyond ethnocentrism.
THE COLONIALITY OF GENDER: ANOTHER WOMAN IS POSSIBLE
If we take the globe as our framework, the first striking datum to
emerge is that people across the globe have not always been doing
gender, and, moreover, even if they did do it, they have done it on very
different termsdepending onwhere they lived. It is onlywith the emer-
gence of a worldwide capitalist system that the gender binary of ‘men’
versus ‘women’ gained worldwide hegemony. This does not mean that
sexual difference did not exist before capitalism, nor does it imply that
we should indulge in the nostalgia of a gender fluid past. It simply
means taking note of the historically situated nature of the current
gender regime, and, in particular, of the fact that binary gender roles
were not as universally accepted as the primary criteria through which
bodies were classified, as they are today. Modern capitalism made the
mononuclear bourgeois family—with its binary gender roles—hege-
monic, and themodern sovereign state with its bureaucratic apparatus
sealed that gender binary on us through state IDs and passports.
Marxist feminists have long emphasized that capitalism needs a
gendered division of labour because, as it is predicated on the endless
expansion of profit, it needs both the extraction of surplus value from
waged productive labour as well as unpaid reproductive labour, which
is still largely performed by gendered bodies. To put it bluntly, capital-
ism needs ‘women’. It relies on the assumption that when women are
washing their husband’s and children’s socks, they are not ‘working’
but merely performing a function ordained for them by nature.
As Maria Mies, among others, has emphasized, perceiving
women’s care work as the consequence of their nature, instead of as
the actual work it is, is pivotal to maintaining the division between
‘waged labour’, which is subject to exploitation, and ‘unwaged labour’,
which is subject to what she, along with others, has termed ‘super-
exploitation’.23 This form of gendered exploitation is ‘super’ because,
23 Maria Mies, Patriarchy and Accumulation on aWorld Scale: Women in the International
Division of Labour (London: Zed Books, 1986).
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whereas the exploitation of waged labour takes place through the
extraction of surplus value, the exploitation of women’s domestic
labour takes place via denying their work the very status of work.
By building on these types of insights, Maria Lugones put for-
ward the very useful concept of the ‘coloniality of gender.’24 She
uses this concept to emphasize how the ‘male/female’ binary and the
racial classification of bodies were both systems that Europeans expor-
ted through the colonial expansion that accompanied the worldwide
spread of capitalism. Within the American context, Lugones shows
how gender roles were much more flexible and variegated among
Native Americans before the arrival of European settlers. Different
indigenous nations possess, for instance, a third gender category to
positively recognize intersex and queer subjectivities, whereas others,
such as the Yuma, attribute gender roles on the basis of dreams, so that
a AFAB woman who dreams of weapons is considered and treated,
for all practical purposes, as a man. This shows that there has been
a systematic intertwinement between the expansion of the capitalist
economy, the racial classification of bodies, and gender oppression.
It is manifestly true, and yet all too often forgotten, that to classify
people on the basis of their skin colour or their genitalia is not an a
priori of the human mind. Classifying bodies on the basis of their sex,
as well as classifying them on the basis of their race, implies, among
other things, a primacy of the visual register. According to Oyèrónkẹ́
Oyěwùmí, such a primacy is typical of the West, particularly when
looked at from the perspective of the Yoruba pre-colonial cultures. As
she points out in her seminal workThe Invention ofWomen, the Yoruba
cultures, for instance, relied much more on the oral transmission of
information than on its visualization, and they valued age over all
other criteria for social hegemony.25 They did not even have a name
to oppose men and women before colonialism: to put it bluntly, they
simply did not ‘do’ gender.
24 Maria Lugones, ‘The Coloniality of Gender’, in The Palgrave Handbook of Gender
and Development: Critical Engagements in Feminist Theory and Practice, ed. by Wendy
Harcourt (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 13–33.
25 Oyèrónkẹ́ Oyěwùmí, The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western
Gender Discourses (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).
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Therefore, questioning the coloniality of gender also means ques-
tioning the primacy of the visual: it is by seeing bodies thatwe say ‘here
is a woman!’ or ‘that is aman!’ But it is alsowithin such a visual register
that we have to operate in order to question hegemonic and hetero-
normative views of womanhood and thereby open new paths toward
subverting them. To propose another slogan, we could say: ‘Another
woman is possible; another woman has always already begun.’
AN ONGOING MANIFESTO
These words, ‘another woman is possible; another woman has always
already begun’ could indeed be the starting point of a new anarchafem-
inistmanifesto. In contrast to othermanifestos, an anarchafeminist one
would inevitably need to be open and as ongoing as the transindividual
ontology uponwhich it rests.26 Startingwith ErricoMalatesta’s insight
that anarchism is a method, and thus not a programme27 that can be
given once for all, the writing of such amanifesto could begin with the
following points:
FIRST: At the beginning was movement:Anarchism does not mean
an absence of order but rather searching for a social order without an
‘orderer’. The main ‘orderer’ of our established ways of thinking about
politics is the state. Becausewe are so accustomed to living in sovereign
states we tend to perceive the migration of bodies across the globe as a
problem. On the contrary, we should remember that sovereign states
are a relatively recent historical phenomenon (for most of humanity,
peoples have lived under other types of political formations) and that
human beings have been migrating across the Earth since the very ap-
pearance of the so-calledHomo sapiens.Homo sapiens is therefore also
a Femina migrans, or even better, an Esse migrans, hence the need for
an anarchafeminism beyond boundaries and beyond ethnocentrism.
SECOND: Just do it:28 Do not aim to seize state power or wait
for the state to give you power, just start exercising your power right
26 InMay 2019, a collective writing project called ‘Anarchafeminist Manifesto 1.0’ began
on Public Seminar. The readers who are interested are invited to follow at <https:
//publicseminar.org/2020/05/anarchafeminist-manifesto-1-0/>.
27 Errico Malatesta, L’Anarchia [1891] (Rome: Datanews, 2001), p. 39.
28 ‘Just do it’ can also mean to subversively re-appropriate a corporate power logo, and
thus re-appropriate what capitalism has stolen from us.
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now. Aiming to seize state power, or asking for recognition from the
state, means reproducing that very same power structure that needs to
be questioned in the first place. This means not only ‘think globally,
and act locally’; it also means that a little bit of freedom is within
everybody’s reach and can be exercised in a number of ways that are
not mutually exclusive. This could include general strikes, grassroots
organizing, civil disobedience, and boycotts, but also resisting gender
norms, subverting or playing with them, refusing to comply, and so on
and so forth. The latter actions are not simply ‘individualist strategies,’
as some have labelled them; instead, they are political acts as such,
which can go hand in hand with larger projects, as can be seen in the
increasing number of women’s strikes, communal living spaces, and
queered families proliferating around the globe. To think about bodies
as transindividual processes alsomeans that we should escape the false
alternative between individual versus collective strategies, and work at
all different levels simultaneously. The oppression is global, and so the
fight has to be global as well.
THIRD: The end is the means; the means is the end: There cannot
and there should not be any fully-fledged political programme for
an anarchafeminist manifesto. This does not mean that there cannot
and there should not be any site-specific and time-limited political
programme: it simply means that there cannot be a unique one fit for
all different possible intersections of axes of oppression. If freedom is
the end, freedom must also be the means to reach it. Anarchism is a
method for thinking as well as for acting, because acting is thinking
and thinking is acting. In the same way in which bodies are plural,
their oppression is plural as well, and so the strategies of fighting it
must be plural as well. As anarchists have been saying for a long time:
‘multiply your associations and be free.’ In other words, search for
freedom in all of your social relations, not simply in electoral and
institutional politics, though the latter may also be one of the levels
you operate at. But if freedom is both themeans and the end, then one
can also envisage a world free from the very notion of gender as well
as the oppressive structures it generates. Because gendered bodies are
still the worldwide objects of exploitation and domination, we need
an anarchafeminist manifesto right here and right now. But such a
manifesto should be conceived as a ladder that we may well abandon
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once we have reached the top. Indeed, it is implicit in the very process
of embarking upon such an anarchafeminist project, that we should
strive for aworld beyond the opposition betweenmen andwomen and
thus, also, in a way, beyond feminism itself.
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